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Using FRAM to explore sources of 
performance variability in intravenous 
infusion administration in ICU: A non-
normative approach to systems 
contradictions 
Abstract 
Systems contradictions present challenges that need to be effectively managed, e.g. due to 
conflicting rules and advice, goal conflicts, and mismatches between demand and capacity. We apply 
FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) to intravenous infusion practices in an intensive care 
unit (ICU) to explore how tensions and contradictions are managed by people. A multi-disciplinary 
team including individuals from nursing, medical, pharmacy, safety, IT and human factors 
backgrounds contributed to this analysis. A FRAM model investigation resulting in seven functional 
areas are described. A tabular analysis highlights significant areas of performance variability, e.g. 
administering medication before a prescription, prioritising drugs, different degrees of double 
checking and using sites showing early signs of infection for intravenous access. Our FRAM analysis 
has been non-normative: performance variability is not necessarily wanted or unwanted, it is merely 
necessary where system contradictions cannot be easily resolved and so adaptive capacity is 
required to cope. 
Keywords: FRAM; Infusion; Critical Care. 
1 Introduction 
Intravenous infusion administration is a safety critical task that is common in modern hospitals with 
high levels of discrepancies and errors (Schnock et al., 2017; Lyons et al., 2018). The details and 
benefits of technological solutions like smart pumps (Schnock et al., 2017; Lyons et al., 2018), closed-
loop systems (Furniss et al., 2019a) and other forms of automation are being explored (Sujan et al., 
2019b). However, recent research suggests that this area is a complex adaptive system where 
interventions do not have a simple deterministic effect but locally appropriate solutions could 
improve safety (Blandford et al., 2019). This means that complex sociotechnical interactions need to 
be examined to understand how everyday performance variability emerges, e.g. between structure 
and agency (Furniss et al., 2019b). A recent special issue on Resilient Health Care in the journal 
Safety Science (Hollnagel et al., 2019) included several papers that demonstrated how FRAM might 
be used to describe and to understand performance variability in healthcare settings.  For example, 
FRAM has already been applied to show some of the complexity of drug administration on a 
neonatal intensive care unit in Turkey, which gives examples of error occurrence and recovery (Kaya 
et al., 2019). FRAM has been applied to understand the variability in the double-checking procedures 
for injectable medicines in the Netherlands, which described barriers and facilitators as to why these 
checks are not performed correctly (Schutijser et al., 2019). It has also been applied to understand 
workarounds when managing the co-administration of infusions in ICU, e.g. when there are 
compatibility issues and inadequate venous access (Oduyale et al., 2020). We build on these 
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examples to use FRAM to explore sources of performance variability for intravenous infusion 
administration in an intensive care unit (ICU) in England, focusing on sources of performance 
variability and underlying systems contradictions.  
2 Background 
Resilience is defined as "the intrinsic ability of a system or organization to adjust its functioning prior 
to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities so that it can sustain required 
operations under both expected and unexpected conditions" (Hollnagel, et al., 2015). So at the heart 
of Resilience Engineering is the idea of adaptation, because complex sociotechnical systems are 
underspecified and not wholly predictable so adaptation is necessary for successful performance. 
Resilience Engineering therefore concerns itself with studying how this adaptive capacity operates, 
and how it can be supported in practice. Resilience Engineering proposes that rather than reducing 
adverse events per se we should be enhancing resilience abilities of the system to succeed under 
varying conditions, e.g. focus on how the system monitors, anticipates, responds, and learns 
(Hollnagel, 2011). 
Safety-II has its roots in Resilience Engineering, and it might be argued that the two are synonymous. 
However, with the relabelling comes a contrast with Safety-I, which might be an oversimplification 
but is still useful (Lawton, 2018; Sujan et al., 2019a). Safety-I is defined as a ‘find and fix’ approach to 
safety that tries to resolve problems to ensure the poor outcomes do not happen or never happen 
again (Hollnagel, et al., 2015). At its simplest these problems are conceptualised as single 
component failures, sometimes called the root cause. However, in practice, many safety projects are 
configured to focus on reducing risk so it is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP), which can 
involve addressing multiple vulnerabilities. Safety-II’s mantra tries to turn this on its head, so rather 
than preventing as many things as possible from going wrong, we try to make as many things as 
possible go right (Hollnagel, et al., 2015). Importantly, this expands the scope of concern for safety, 
i.e. we attend how safety is maintained and created in ‘normal’ performance and when things go 
well. This turn to everyday safety also means to better understand work-as-done (WAD) that 
engages with what people ‘actually’ do in practice given goal conflicts and contradictions, in contrast 
to work-as-imagined (WAI) that engages more with what people ‘should’ do from a more idealised 
perspective that can neglect the messiness of practice (Hollnagel, et al., 2015). 
FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) (Hollnagel, 2012) is the best known method 
associated with Resilience Engineering and Safety-II. Its purpose is to examine the performance 
variability of complex sociotechnical systems to better understand WAD. It decomposes the system 
into functions, to move away from ‘what a system is’ to ‘what it does’. Each function is examined for 
its potential performance variability, then interactions between functions are examined. ‘Functional 
resonance’ is used to describe how outcomes can ‘emerge’ from everyday variability of many 
functions, to move away from simple notions of ‘cause and effect’. FRAM is built on four principles 
(Hollnagel, 2012): 
 The principle of equivalence of success and failure –  Success and failure come from the 
same source, i.e. they are not fundamentally different in nature. Approximate adjustments 
mean that people adapt successful most of the time but sometimes variability in 
performance will lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. 
 The principle of approximate adjustments – Due to limitations in resource, uncertainties, 
underspecified systems and variance demands people will adjust to suit the situation. This 


































































 The principle of emergence – Complex systems with many links and fluctuating approximate 
adjustments become intractable as it is impossible to predict what will happen precisely 
beyond expecting regular events. 
 The principle of functional resonance – Functions represent the different things a system 
does. Due to approximate adjustments these will exhibit performance variability. Functional 
resonance refers to how functions may impact each other’s performance variability. Small 
changes could lead to disproportionally large effects and vice versa. 
FRAM’s history shows that it continues to evolve. It was first proposed as the Functional Resonance 
Accident Model (Hollnagel, 2004) which was focused on how functions can amplify and resonate to 
spiral out of control. FRAM (Hollnagel, 2012) was reborn into the Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method, which proposes to examine and manage both wanted and unwanted forms of performance 
variability. This is more in keeping with Safety II’s concern for both positive and negative outcomes. 
There are different styles of FRAM study. Many studies, particularly the early ones, focus on 
understanding the complex functional interactions that led to something bad happening or 
unwanted variability that could lead to something bad happening, e.g. studies looking at near miss 
and accident analyses (e.g. Nouvel, et al., 2007; Hollnagel et al. 2008; Herrera & Woltjer 2010; De 
Carvalho 2011), risk and safety assessments (e.g. Lundblad et al. 2008; Woltjer & Hollnagel 2008; 
Belmonte et al. 2011; Pereira 2013), and hazard analyses (e.g. Frost & Mo 2014). In contrast, Furniss 
et al. (2016) perform a different style of FRAM looking at how functions can positively resonate to 
understand whether a sociotechnical system will flourish or stall, beyond the concerns of safety. 
Many modern studies using FRAM take a more neutral approach to performance variability, which 
try to understand its presence, nature and how to manage it, e.g. to assess vulnerabilities and 
opportunities between opponents in an adversarial war game (Woltjer et al., 2009); to analyse why 
fluoride varnish is not applied by dentists and to design a complex intervention to address this (Ross 
et al., 2018); to support hospital work (Hounsgaard, 2016); and to understand why blood sampling 
varies (Pickup et al., 2017).  
In the current paper we explore a non-normative approach to FRAM, so rather than focusing on 
dampening unwanted variability or amplifying positive variability per se we take sources of 
performance variability as a starting point to understand and describe underlying systems 
contradictions (Sujan et al., 2002; Sujan et al., 2015). The notion of contradictions is rooted in 
cultural-historic activity theory (Cole, 1998). Systems contradictions present people with margins of 
manoeuvre that need to be effectively managed, e.g. due to conflicting rules and advice, goal 
conflicts, trade-offs and mismatches between demand and capacity and mismatches between 
competences and situational issues.       
3 Method 
3.1 Setting 
The ICU is part of a teaching hospital in the Midlands in England. The unit has 20 beds. There is 
generally one nurse per patient, and doctors are routinely present. The unit uses paper prescription 
charts and smart infusion pumps that are programmed with the rate, time and dose. The smart 
pumps contain a drug library with hard and soft limits. An Electronic Health Record (EHR) is used to 
record drug administration volumes and review patient records. The double checking of drug 
administration by two nurses is recorded by signatures on paper. The ICU has invested in some 
ready to administer infusions that can be immediately administered to the patient (e.g. fentanyl, 


































































and morphine) which just require to be drawn up into a syringe.  The remainder must be made up on 
the ward. 
3.2 Ethics and project context 
The work was undertaken as service improvement and had received local approvals from the 
hospital R&D department. All authors of the paper were both participants and investigators on the 
project, so no research subjects were recruited and consent was not required. Members of the ICU 
team wanted to better understand how automated and autonomous technologies could help with 
intravenous infusion administration on the ward. Specialists in safety assurance, NHS IT and human 
factors were part of the project team and the project advisory board. The study involved co-
designing research questions, joint sensemaking and was collaborative in nature (Zamenopoulos, & 
Alexiou, 2018) 
3.3 Data collection 
A series of meetings and workshops were held roughly on a monthly basis between September 2018 
– May 2019, supported by emails and communications between, to share ideas and understand 
more about intravenous infusion administration on the unit. Clinical input to the workshops was 
provided by the clinicians on the project team who were also practicing members of staff at the ICU 
with backgrounds in intensive care nursing, pharmacy and anaesthesia.  The initial familiarisation 
period included two process walks as well as in-depth demonstrations of the infusion pumps and IT 
systems by the clinical team members to the non-clinical team members.  The FRAM analysis was 
facilitated by DF and MS, who are both experienced with the methodology. Data were recorded in 
graphical format using the FRAM Model Visualiser (Hollnagel & Hill, 2016), in tabular format (for 
analysing functions), and in detailed free-text notes. The analysis was complemented by experiences 
from a previous project DF was involved with that investigated intravenous infusion administration 
practices and errors in England (e.g. Blandford et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2018; Furniss et al., 2019a).  
3.4 FRAM analysis 
Functions were identified and mapped in a FRAM network diagram to develop the generic FRAM 
model for intravenous infusion administration. Each function has six aspects (see Figure 1), whereby 
the output of one function can influence the variability of another function’s aspect – this forms the 
basis of how the variability of many functions can lead to resonance. Reflecting on each function’s 
aspects can identify more functions and functional links. To help make sense of this functional 
network colours were used to group the functions into different areas of functional activity, links 
between functions were also used to specify the main relationships even though these could vary 
depending on different instantiations of this model.   
 


































































The generic FRAM model and insights into performance variability were developed iteratively 
alongside the generation of questions , data gathering and analysis. We described the main sources 
of performance variability and where this was high developed a tabular analysis to investigate. 
Resilience abilities (Hollnagel, 2011) were also brought into this analysis where relevant to try to 
identify more abstract markers of resilience: 
 Adaptation – knowing what to do in the face of disturbances, issues and opportunities; 
 Monitor – knowing what to look for and monitor which might impact performance; 
 Learn – to be able to learn the right lessons from the right experiences; and 
 Anticipate – be able to anticipate issues and opportunities in the future. 
The analysis focused on tensions and contradictions that could be a source of dynamic trade-offs 
that need to be negotiated for safety (e.g. Sujan et al., 2015). It also included uncertain performance 
conditions, where the next course of action might be unclear. For example, this could include a 
mismatch between resource and situational demand, conflicting procedural advice and competing 
system goals, and a mismatch between competence and situational demands.  
The analysis excluded the usual failure modes associated with SHERPA (Embrey, 1986) and FMEA 
(Stamatis, 2003) (e.g. right action on wrong object, action omitted, etc.). It could be argued that 
these failures are just part of everyday performance variability, but they come with a negative and 
normative connotation (i.e. the “failure” in failure modes is a negative).  We wanted to look at 
performance variability as something inevitable and potentially useful.  That is why we focused our 
analysis on contradictions and goal conflicts inherent in the system, and how they are managed for 
everyday safety. From this perspective traditional failure modes could be a distraction, leading back 
to hackneyed ways of ‘find and fix’ thinking. Failure modes are important, and form part of the 
whole picture of performance variability, but they were intentionally not a focus of our analysis. 
4 Results 
4.1 FRAM: Generic model of intravenous infusion practice 
Our FRAM model includes 38 separate functions (Figure 2). Figure 2 shows seven different areas of 
functional activity including medication ordering (green nodes); preparing the intravenous infusion 
(blue nodes); interacting with the patient (grey nodes); administering the infusion (red nodes); 
double checking of the preparation and administration (yellow node); monitoring and 
documentation of the administration (purple nodes). Three miscellaneous activities: other things the 
nurse is doing, other things the doctor is doing, and other things the patient are doing are not shown 
in Figure 2 – this is due to their non-specific influence on many functions. Figure 2 has a ‘modern’ 
rendering using the FRAM Model Visualiser (Hollnagel & Hill, 2016) so background functions, which 
only provide input to foreground functions, are not displayed as hexagons. This does not mean they 
are not influential. Background functions are meant to be part of the context rather than the system, 
but for reading Figure 2 this division can be considered fairly arbitrary. The references in boxes, e.g. 
1.A. and 2.C., are cross-references for variability described in Tables 1-3. 
4.2 Description of performance variability for our ICU setting 
The following section describes the variability in and around intravenous infusion administration, 
which relate to the seven areas of functional activity identified in Figure 2. 
4.2.1 Medication Order 
Four functions relating to medication order were recognised in Figure 2. To order medication ideally 


































































to ensure they get the administration right. However, this is not always possible, for example in 
urgent cases where a verbal order may be given. Table 1 details this and other forms of variability 
that occur in the prescribing and medication order process. 
The medication order varies in important ways. There could be an order for a new drug, there may 
be an order to continue a drug a patient is already receiving, or an order to change the details of 
administration e.g. rate, dose, etc. The order could be for a one-off dose, a continuous infusion or an 
infusion that needs to be titrated to patient need. The order might be for immediate administration 
or it might stretch over hours and days. 
One of the most interesting sources of variability for ordering medication is whether it is written or 
verbal, as this can have a large impact on the process downstream. The benefit of introducing this 
performance variability (i.e. written or verbal) is that it can deal with different kinds of demands, e.g. 
a verbal order is very good when there is an urgent need for treating the patient and conversely a 
written order provides a clear audit trail and details for nurses to act upon. Verbal orders tend to be 
in the presence of the doctor, e.g. during admission or when the doctor is treating the patient like 
putting a central line in or giving life support. After the admission or treatment is complete the 
doctor will often sit down and do the paperwork including the prescription. The other main way is 
for the nurse to anticipate or respond to what the patient needs before the doctor and prompt the 
doctor for this who can then review and write it up later. To help try to mitigate the risk of error two 
nurses should hear the order if it is a high-risk medication, if it is a low risk medication then this is 
not warranted. Nurses will document the medication administration in their notes, so it is recorded 
somewhere even in the absence of a written prescription.  
The order may be initiated by the nurse, by the doctor, or discussed jointly. This is an interesting 
source of variability because it has implications for control and sensemaking. Ideally both the nurse 
and the doctor will have a coherent view of the patient, e.g. what is wrong with them, what needs to 
be done, their trajectory and some anticipation about what issues may arise. Medication orders 
should be understood and fit this picture. If a medication order does not fit this picture then there 
should be a sense of unease and a need to question further. For example, a nurse might challenge a 
doctor about an unusual prescription. Similarly, if a nurse is monitoring a patient who needs 
medication for some reason they can suggest this to a doctor and if the request is coherent with the 
doctor’s view of the patient and what the nurse is telling them then they could approve it. 
4.2.2 Preparation of medication administration  
Nine functions relating to medication administration were recognised in Figure 2. This ICU has 
invested in pre-prepared medication for high risk infusions so the nurses do not need to make it up 
on the ward. This saves the nurses time in preparing medication and adds control for variability that 
could occur during the preparation process, i.e. so what is inside bags and syringes is consistent 
because it is made in pharmacy away from the ward. This greatly simplifies the medication 
preparation process because the nurse merely has to collect the right medication and the equipment 
needed to administer the infusion, e.g. a giving set, a label for the giving set, etc. This stage in the 
process, due to the pre-pared medications, has a lower potential for performance variability. 



















































Figure 2: FRAM network diagram of intravenous infusion administration [Green nodes: medication order; Blue nodes: preparation; Red nodes: 
administration; Yellow node: double checking; Purple nodes: monitoring and documentation; Grey nodes: patient interaction]. The references in boxes, e.g. 


































































Table 1: Medication Order variability (resilience abilities in italics) 
Manifestation of 
variability: what 
was observed?  
Contradictions and uncertain 
performance conditions: how 
does this demonstrate resilience?  
Further notes and wider 
system activity: what 
other 
upstream/downstream 




There could be a 
written 
prescription or a 
verbal order for a 
drug. 
There might be an emergency 
scenario whereby the drug has to 
be given immediately, or doctors 
may be too busy to write an 
order so advise that the 
administration proceed without it 
(adaptation).  
In all cases a written order 
should follow a verbal 
order. This creates an 
extra function for the 
nurse and doctor to 





could come before 
or after the 
administration. 
Nurses may perceive a need for 
fluids or drugs but the doctors 
might not have written an order 
yet. For example, a continuous 
infusion might need to be 
officially reordered when the 
current infusion is ending but the 
doctors might be unavailable, so 
the nurse continues it in 
anticipation of an order. 
Again, this creates an 
extra function for the 
nurse to monitor that they 
follow this up with the 





could be very 
specific and 
comprehensive 
about rate, dose, 
etc.; it could also 




What details are missing, how 
they are perceived and the 
demands of the context will 
impact the adaptive strategies 
chosen: If these are perceived as 
important then the doctor should 
be challenged.  If not perceived 
as important the nurse will most 
likely get on with it, and add 
and/or correct details later if 
necessary. The urgency of the 
drug, its potency, and the 
availability of the doctor might 
also influence how individuals 
adapt. There is a trade-off 
between being efficient (getting 
on with the task) or being 
thorough (making sure all 
information is complete and 
correct). 
Challenging the doctor 
depends on perceived 
consequences (e.g. how 
uneasy the nurse feels 
about the missing 
information), and the 
availability of the doctor 
(e.g. if they are present or 
the next bed along the 
cost is low, if they are 
away from the ward they 
could be hard to find and 




4.2.3 Patient and visitor interaction 
Four functions relating to patient and visitor interaction were recognised in Figure 2. Many patients 
are sedated and not awake in ICU and so the potential involvement of patients and visitors in 
medication administration is low compared to general wards. If the patient is awake and well 


































































interaction is handled on a case by case basis (adaptation). Nurses generally will only look after one 
very sick patient, and not 7-12 patients on a more general ward, so there is less likelihood they will 
get patients and their details confused, i.e. there is lower variability here. 
4.2.4 Medication administration 
Thirteen functions relating to medication administration were recognised in Figure 2. Generally, the 
nurse will proceed with hanging the bag or putting the syringe in the pump, programming the pump, 
setting up a line, checking the access point, flushing it, connecting the line and then starting the 
pump. The nurse will monitor the infusion to check there are no blockages and that it is proceeding 
as expected.  
An interesting source of variability in this section, which needs to be managed, and is different to 
other non-critical care contexts, is managing the throughput of the intravenous infusion 
medications. Critical care patients may need many infusions and today’s technology means that 
patient can be on 10-20 infusions at one time. When patients are this sick there may be two nurses 
looking after the one patient. The management of these infusions, including the different priorities, 
titrations, timings, different lines and access points can be challenging. For example a patient might 
have a limited number of operational lines, already have the majority of them being used, then be 
prescribed more infusions some which are short, some longer but more urgent and others that 
should be given at certain times (e.g. an antibiotic that needs to be administered every six hours). 
These might not always be compatible either. 
This prioritisation of medications is constantly evaluated as new medications are added and the 
patient condition changes, e.g. there might be a spike in blood sugar levels which suddenly means 
that administering insulin becomes more important and urgent then it had been before. If in doubt 
about what to prioritise nurses can speak to doctors or senior colleagues. Variability associated with 
medication administration is captured in Table 2. 
Table 2: Medication administration variability (resilience abilities in italics) 
Manifestation of 
variability: what 
was observed?  
Contradictions and uncertain 
performance conditions: how does 
this demonstrate resilience?  
Further notes and wider 
system activity: what 
other 
upstream/downstream 
links does this variability 
have? 
Reference 




priority or ‘pecking 
order’. 
There may be many drugs 
prescribed for the patient, and the 
patient may be limited by the 
amount they can take concurrently 
when considering access points and 
incompatible drugs cannot go 
down the same access points. The 
nurse will administer drugs as best 
they can, e.g. doing short infusions 
first and prioritising more critical 
drugs (adaptive strategy). 
Nurses will learn 
strategies to deliver 
infusions timely and 
effectively.  
2.A. 
Drug is infused 
through faster than 
‘normal’. 
As above, but rather than infusing 
drugs at normal speed they may be 
infused faster, with consideration 
to the impact of this, to make room 
Nurses will learn 
strategies to deliver 




































































for other infusions (adaptive 
strategy). 
The access site 
might be used 
despite it being in 
poor condition 
Nurses should check intravenous 
infusion access points are good 
before use. However, it might be 
that delaying urgent drugs is worse 
then using a poor access point, so it 
will be used (adapting). 
This trade-off could lead 
to infection issues that 
need further intervention, 
but administering vital 




4.2.5 Double checking 
One double checking function, which had multiple links, was recognised in Figure 2. Double checking 
by a registered nurse should take place once when the drugs have been gathered but before the 
infusion is set-up and started to ensure that the prescription, preparation and administration of the 
infusion are performed on the correct patient as expected.  
However, as above, we find that variability is inevitable given the uncertainties and contradictions 
that are inherent in the system, e.g. there are competing policies and priorities around not leaving 
your patient and needing to leave them to double check someone else’s infusion. So variability 
serves a good reason, to try to satisfy competing goals and to reduce interruption to work. The main 
source of variability is a tension between fulfilling concurrent activities across different members of 
staff who are meant to be involved in the check, and the subjective risk assessment of those staff to 
determine what sort of check would be satisfactory. See Table 3 for double checking variability.  
Table 3: Double Checking variability (resilience abilities in italics) 
Manifestation of 
variability: what was 
observed?  
Contradictions and uncertain 
performance conditions: how 
does this demonstrate 
resilience?  
Further notes and wider 
system activity: what other 
upstream/downstream links 




Double checking is 
not always done. 
There is a trade-off in other 
operational demands of the ICU 
and the perceived risks of the 
medication administration 
(adaptation/anticipation). 
Many activities are 
happening concurrently in 
ICU, so there is a cost and 
inconvenience in interrupting 
these other activities.  
3.A. 
The thoroughness of 
the check can vary, 
e.g. just a 
confirmation versus 
a more independent 
check. 
The double check is often done 
together rather than being an 
independent check. This is 
perceived to save time and 
effort. A full independent check 
does not naturally fit with the 
working patterns of the nurses 
(adaptation). 
Doing the double check 
together can allow for 
discussion and wider 
monitoring activities 
between staff, e.g. how the 
member of staff is doing and 
checking the situation of the 
patient.  
3.B. 
What is actually 
checked can vary. 
This can manifest at 
different levels. At a 




patient, and infusion 
Again there is a trade-off in 
other demands and the 
perceived risks of the 
medication administration. For 
example, someone who is 
training to do intravenous 
administration of a high risk 
drug would have a thorough 
check – indeed this training 
Basic training seems a special 
case, but there are a whole 
host of shades of experience 
between this and highly 
experienced nurses where 
they can learn from each 
other beyond checking items 
but being involved in 



































































pump all checked? 
At finer grained level 





insertion site and 
allergies checked? 
scenario might be one of the 
main occasions where 
everything is checked 
methodically. In contrast, an 
experienced nurse giving a low 
risk drug might receive a short 
confirmatory check more to 
fulfil the requirement that some 
check has taken place rather 
than any real interrogation of 
what is happening 
(adaptation/anticipation). 
for patients. For example, 
experienced nurses might 
want reassurance if they are 
dealing with a drug they are 
not used to.  
 
Depending on the situation 
nurses might focus on items 
they think are critical to 
check (anticipation). 
The timing of the 
check can vary, e.g. 
before or after the 
administration. 
The more unease about an 
administration there is the 
more staff will wait for a double 
check before proceeding. Staff 
may proceed with the 
administration if it is low risk, 
urgent and other staff are 
unavailable for a double check. 
Staff may seek a double check 
after administration for 
enhanced monitoring. 
Many tasks are planned and 
proceed concurrently 
between busy individuals. 
There is a negotiation 
between perceived risks and 
priorities, as well as allowing 
flexibility for tasks to 




There are different ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors involved in the subjective risk assessment by staff. If the 
person who is meant to be doing the check feels uneasy about the infusion, e.g. the member of staff 
may be new, they may be busy and appear stressed, it might be a high-risk drug, the patient might 
be particularly poorly, etc. they might ‘push’ a more thorough check on to the process. If the nurse 
who is meant to be receiving the check feels uneasy, for similar reasons to that outlined above, then 
they might ‘pull’ or invite a more thorough check. The workload of both members of staff and the 
criticality of interrupting their activities will also interact with the thoroughness of the check and 
when and where it is done. Double checking might also be affected by the team culture (e.g. tension 
could be caused if someone is doing them pedantically and the team is not doing them thoroughly).   
4.2.6 Monitoring and documentation 
Three functions relating to monitoring and documentation were recognised in Figure 2. Once the 
nurse has set up the infusion they should document what they have done, monitor the infusion and 
the patient’s response to the infusion. The nurse reported that they would continuously monitor for 
alerts and alarms, react accordingly and do hourly checks. They reported that the design of the 
medication chart is not good, which might mean more mistakes and omissions, but these should be 
picked up during ward rounds and shift handovers. 
The patient is first seen by the admitting doctor and should be seen by a consultant within 12 hours. 
This can depend on doctor’s workload and priorities. Time pressure may mean not all patients are 
seen; and some patients may have a more detailed review compared to others depending on need.  
The patient will have a full review once per day, and be seen on the ward round by the entire team. 
There is often a second less formal ward round. The ward round might focus on more interesting 


































































A handover sheet is prepared for shift handover, from day to night, etc. There are independent 
handovers between nurses, and separate handovers between doctors, so no multidisciplinary 
handover and they come together during ward rounds. The shift handover operates as a safety 
check as the patient’s prescription chart, infusions and results will be reviewed.  
4.2.7 Broader system activities 
Three functions relating to broader system activities on ICU were recognised in Figure 2. Intravenous 
infusion administration takes place within a broader set of activities, some of which are predictable 
and others less so. For example, nurses may be busy with other patients if they need to look after 
more than one patient, they might be drawn away by an emergency, to get something or need to be 
on a break. Floating nurses may provide the extra capacity for extended periods away, e.g. a break, 
and adjacent nurses might be able to cover temporarily, e.g. if a nurse has to get something.  
Doctors are normally more available on ICU compared to general wards because of the state of the 
patients and the shorter time scales in which things can develop and decisions need to be made. 
However, doctors may be busy or unavailable for a multitude of reasons, e.g. called away for 
emergency support of a patient on a different ward. 
There might also be other demands on the patient that can disturb plans and infusion 
administration, e.g. the patient may need to be bathed, or they might be rushed off to have a CT 
scan where all infusions are disconnected (except the most critical ones, e.g. to keep them 
unconscious). These pressures will impact how the functions, tasks and activities are coordinated. 
5 Discussion 
We wanted to explore what inherent contradictions there are in the system and how they are 
managed for everyday safety, which seemed more conducive to Resilience Engineering thinking than 
looking at error occurrence and recovery. Following this, a defining feature of our FRAM analysis has 
been its non-normative approach to understanding systems contradictions, which fits with those 
FRAM studies that take a more neutral approach to performance variability (e.g. Pickup et al., 2017; 
Ross et al., 2018). We intentionally excluded failure modes from our analysis, not because they are 
not important, but because we did not propose that type of analysis. To situate this use of FRAM, we 
believe it is useful to distinguish these different styles of use: 
 Potential failures, e.g. error occurrence and recovery; 
 Positive resonance and systems that excel; 
 Wanted and unwanted variability; and  
 Inherent contradictions and underlying goal conflicts. 
Of course, a comprehensive analysis might focus on all four. However, there are risks in combined 
approaches that one style will dominate another. For example, it might be easy to pre-judge that a 
cursory double check is unwanted, when actually this has performance gains for other parts of the 
system. This is why our non-normative approach suspended these judgements so these underlying 
contradictions and their rationale could be explored further. 
This paper helps develop the picture of performance variability around intravenous infusion 
medication administration. Kaya et al. (2019) present a FRAM network with similar functions to 
those presented in this paper. However, they focus more on the preparation stage whereas our unit 
had many pre-made drugs so this was less variable. They also do not emphasise the high degree of 
variability found around verbal orders, double checks and tube management that we found in our 


































































medication administration. Furniss et al. (2018) describe some of the variability in double checking 
procedures and practices between hospitals in England, which include doing single checks for some 
drugs, different degrees of independent check, and checks covering different parts of the 
administration process. Our study suggests the nurse’s risk and situational assessment is key in 
determining what type of double check is satisfactory. Schutijser et al. (2019) highlight practices like 
a digital double check which were not available in our ICU setting because their practice is paper-
based, but they do not discuss much the thoroughness of the double check (e.g. whether it is fully 
independent or more of a confirmatory check that is done together with the two nurses), the factors 
involved in whether a nurse might invite a more thorough double check or whether the checking 
nurse might push for a more thorough double check, which were features of our study. Differences 
between similar studies are to be expected 1) due to the actual variability between settings, and 2) 
due to variability between analyses especially where systems are complex and nuances can be hard 
to handle.  
Furniss et al. (2019) proposed that complex sociotechnical interactions need to be examined to 
understand how everyday performance variability emerges, e.g. between structure and agency. In 
this paper we have seen how contradictions between structures can create margins of manoeuvre 
that need to be negotiated for safety. An example of a tension is when a nurse is instructed to give a 
list of medicines that the patient cannot receive all at once, so they need to prioritise what to give 
first (e.g. Oduyale et al., 2020). So, the tensions or contradiction is built into the objective (or goal) of 
the function <administer medications>, because the patient should get all required medications, but 
they cannot all be given at the same time. An example of a tension between activities is the double-
checking function.  Considered by itself and isolation, this function should happen all the time, i.e. 
should have 100% reliability.  However, as there are other activities and competing goals and 
priorities, nurses use their subjective assessment of the context and the risks involved in a particular 
situation to resolve this tension through a dynamic trade-off (see ETTO Hollnagel, 2009). 
The normal advice in how to manage performance variability after doing a FRAM study is to try to 
find ways to dampen unwanted variability and enhance wanted variability (Hollnagel, 2012). 
However, having taken a non-normative approach we have not judged what is wanted and 
unwanted variability, instead variability is merely inherent in the system and has benefits, but can 
also contribute, at times, to unwanted outcomes. Pertinent to the wider context of our project is 
that we do not want to introduce new technologies that might design out the adaptive capacity to 
cope with variability. For example, we have seen that some medication can be administered before a 
prescription is written – work-as-imagined (WAI) would dictate that this should not happen. A naïve 
design might focus on WAI and not allow drug administration before a formal written prescription, 
which could be disastrous in urgent cases. Examining the potential enhancement and disruption to 
the management of performance variability, caused by new technology, is part of future work. For 
example, this could include bar code administration systems that might unduly straight jacket 
adaptive behaviour and smart e-prescribing systems that can automatically detect drug conflicts 
with known allergies and other drugs being administered. 
In terms of building the adaptive capacity of the current system we can seek ways to enhance how 
people handle this variability, through supporting internal structural changes, e.g. support people to 
recognise and develop strategies for making trade-offs, how to prioritise, and to know when to 
recognise they need to ask for help. Staff learn these strategies informally on the job, but they are 
rarely made explicit. Indeed, there may be some discomfort in admitting the complexity, risky and 
degraded nature of work and the workarounds that must follow, e.g. giving drugs before a 


































































administer drugs. Even formalising a pecking order to drugs that should be given before or after one 
another may be problematic because of the contextual nature of the decision, e.g. a non-critical 
drug may be given before a critical drug if it is quick so it is not unduly delayed. A first step in 
enhancing the adaptive capacity of individuals might merely be to recognise their expertise, get 
them to reflect and share their repertoire of resilience strategies (Furniss et al., 2011), so they can be 
discussed, monitored and others can learn about them. Developing communities of practice and 
storytelling might help distribute this knowledge. Where sources of performance variability cannot 
be resolved then adaptive capacity should be enhanced.  
External structural design changes can also help and hinder the performance of the system. The 
system has already evolved to the state is in today through organisational and purchasing decisions, 
e.g. choosing the infusion pumps the ICU uses and deciding to invest in pre-made drugs. This already 
influences sources of performance variability. Future organisational and design decisions need to 
consider the potential impact of new interventions to ensure that they manage performance 
variability in the right way, and reduce the chance of unintended consequences. For example, FRAM 
has been proposed to project forward to consider future designs and interventions to assess their 
effectiveness and suitability (Ross et al., 2018; Ferrerira & Cañas, 2019).  
Part of the limitations of this study is that it was only conducted in one ICU, comparing its practices 
with other ICUs would have been interesting. A strength of this study is that it involved different 
disciplines from ICU, albeit the nurse on the project team was the clinician most closely involved in 
the analysis.  This is justified as nurses have the most involvement in the medication administration 
process. However, a larger group of people could have been engaged with for data gathering and 
validation. This work is part of a wider ongoing project looking at the potential for technological 
interventions on the ICU, so direct interventions resulting from this FRAM study were not built in to 
the programme of work. Again, this would be an interesting area of future research.  
6 Conclusions 
We have applied FRAM to explore what inherent contradictions there are in the system and how 
these are managed through performance variability and dynamic trade-offs to create safety on a 
daily basis.  Three main areas of high performance variability are highlighted: medication order, 
medication administration and double checking. We have taken a non-normative approach that 
moves away from issues of compliance, and wanted and unwanted performance variability. 
Consequently, this also looks towards different remedial actions, i.e. rather than reducing risk and 
error per se we want to build adaptive capacity to cope with these inherent contradictions in a 
satisfactory way. These contradictions can be seen as sources of tension between different internal 
and external structures in the system, which invite the agency of individuals to work out how they 
are going to handle these tensions. 
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